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Mr. Justice Rehnquist and Judicial
Self-Restraint
By

JOHN

R.

RYDELL 11*

IN the three years that Justice William Rehnquist has been on the
Court, he has been variously described as "an ideological conservative
. . . staking out a position on the extreme right as soon as he joined
the Court,"' as "a new acerbic voice for the 'strict construction' views
of President Nixon,"2 and as a justice who plays "the part for the right
wing of the Court that Mr. Justice Douglas has so long played for the
left wing."'
Professor Pollack of the Yale Law School has ventured
the more restrained opinion that Rehnquist is "extraordinarily able, but
I can't think of any opinions of his that have surprised me. If his opinions were less predictable, I think he'd be a strong influence on this
4

court."

None of these observations represents more than a tentative reaction, as no one has yet undertaken a comprehensive assessment of
Rehnquist's work on the Court. This essay will, through an examination of selected opinions primarily in the field of civil liberties, delineate the major tenets of Rehnquist's judicial philosophy. While it is
too early in Rehnquist's career to venture conclusions regarding his impact on the Court, it is clear that his pervasive and overriding commitment to judicial self-restraint is generally shared by only a minority of
the present Court. Even this observation must be qualified, however,
for Rehnquist's standards of limited judicial review frequently surface
as the dominant theme in current majority opinions involving criminal
* B.A., 1967, Yale University; J.D., 1974, University of Virginia; Member, California Bar. The author wishes to thank Professor A. E. Dick Howard of the University
of Virginia Law School for his guidance in the preparation of this article.
1. Graham, Supreme Court in Recent Term Began Swing to Right That Was
Sought by Nixon, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1972, at 18, col. 1.
2. Weaver, Supreme Court Divided But Still Unpredictable, N.Y. Times, July 3,
1973, at 1, col. 8.
3. Kurland, 1971 Term: The Year of the Stewart-White Court, 1972 Sup. Or.
REv. 181.
4. Quoted in Green, The Burger Court, The Wall Street Journal, June 29, 1973,
at 22, col. 1.

[8751

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

procedure.

[Vol. 26

Thus, although Rehnquist's role on the Court escapes pre-

cise definition, the subject merits our attention, for this young, articulate, and brilliant justice is likely to be an influential voice on the Court
for years to come.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist and Civil Liberties
Justice Rehnquist joined the Court while it was still in the process
of sifting through the legacy of the Warren years. The 1950's and the
1960's were decades of incredible change for the country as a whole,
and the Court played an uhprecedented role in leading the trend toward greater recognition of civil rights and civil 'liberties. With the
egalitarian ideal as its lodestar,5 the Court became the activist friend
of the downtrodden in American society.
Many liberals were justifiably apprehensive that Rehnquist would
bring to the Court a far narrower concept of its role than that which
had guided a majority of the justices during the Warren era. 6 These
fears were the greatest with respect to civil liberties, because many of
Rehnquist's prior statements indicated a willingness to leave the protection of individual rights in legislative hands. For example, in two articles written early in his career, Rehnquist expressed intense opposition
to judicial activism in the field of civil liberties.'
In 1958, Rehnquist sharply criticized the Court in an article which
began with the assertion:
Communists, former Communists, and others of like political philo5. See Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative
and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARV. L. REv. 143 (1964).
6. Professor Howard has suggested that Rehnquist brought to the bench a fully
worked-out judicial philosophy in much the same manner that Frankfurter did. Howard, Mr. Justice Powell and the Emerging Nixon Majority, 70 MICH. L. REV. 445, 450
(1972).
7. In 1959, Rehnquist authored a piece focusing on the role of personal philosophy in constitutional adjudication. Rehnquist, The Making of a Supreme Court Justice,
29 HARV. L. REC. 7 (No. 2, 1959). He argued there that the Court's power, as construed under such decisions as Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to determine the meaning of the due process and equal protection guarantees results in judicial
lawmaking. Rehnquist, The Making of a Supreme Court Justice, 29 HARv. L. REc. 7,
10 (No. 2, 1959). Given this state of affairs, Rehnquist appealed to the United States
Senate: "It is high time that those critical of the present Court recognize with the late
Charles Evans Hughes that for one hundred seventy-five years the constitution has been
what the judges say it is. If greater judicial self-restraint is desired, or a different interpretation of the phrases 'due process of law' or 'equal protection of the law', then men
sympathetic to such desires must sit upon the high court. The only way for the Senate
to learn of these sympathies is to 'inquire of men on their way to the Supreme Court
something of their views on these questions.'" Id.
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sophy scored significant victories during the October, 1956, Term
of the Supreme Court of the United States ....

8

Specifically, Rehnquist was referring to Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners9 and Konigsberg v. State Bar.'" In the former, the New Mexico
bar examiners had refused to allow Schware to take the bar examination. They found that his use of aliases, former membership in the
Communist Party, and arrest record demonstrated a lack of "good
moral character." Although validating the good moral character requirement, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the judgment in
Schware's case lacked a rational basis and deprived him of due process
of law." In the second bar admission case, the Committee of Bar Examiners of California refused to certify Konigsberg to practice law in
that state, even though he had passed the bar examination, on the
grounds that he had failed to prove both that he was of good moral
character and that he did not advocate forcible overthrow of the government. Although one witness accused him of past membership in
the Communist Party, Konigsberg refused to answer questions regarding -his prior associations. On review, the Supreme Court ordered California to admit Konigsberg -topractice because there was "no evidence
in the record which rationally justifie[d] a finding that Konigsberg failed
to establish his good moral character or failed to show that he did not
advocate forceful overthrow of the Government."'"
Admittedly, these opinions by Justice Black are not models of analytical clarity. Indeed, there is some validity to Rehnquist's point that
the language of the decisions suggests that a constitutional case can be
established whenever a "losing litigant can show to the satisfaction of
some court that a factual finding is not 'rationally justified' [citing
Schware] or that there are not 'substantial doubts' [citing Konigsberg]
to support a negative finding."'1 Noting that the decisions were "not
ostensibly based on any 'civil liberties' claim,"'14 Rehnquist argued that
the Court's independent examinations of the records in these cases
could not be supported on constitutional grounds.' 5 Rehnquist concluded with a stinging rebuke of the Court:
8.
A.B.AJ.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
A.B.A.J.
14.
15.

Rehnquist, The Bar Admission Cases: A Strange Judicial Aberration, 44
229 (1958).
353 U.S. 232 (1957).
353 U.S. 252 (1957).
353 U.S. at 239.
353 U.S. at 273.
Rehnquist, The Bar Admission Cases: A Strange Judicial Aberration, 44
229 (1958).
353 U.S. at 232.
Id.
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A decision of any court based on a combination of charity and ideological sympathy at the expense of generally applicable rules of law
is regrettable no matter whence it comes. But what could be tolerated as a warm-hearted aberration in the local trial judge becomes nothing less than a constitutional transgression when enunciated by the highest court of the land.' 6

A closer reading of Schware and Konigsberg indicates that the
Court's broad factual review in each case may have been motivated by
a concern that a denial of admission would have a dampening effect
on the exercise of First Amendment rights prior to application for admission to the bar. For example, in Konigsberg, Justice Black noted
-that a state cannot exercise its power to select bar members "in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner nor in such a way as to impinge on the
17
freedom of political expression or association."'
Other commentators
urging this rationale have emphasized that Justice Black relied on two
recent decisions' which had used the due process clause in similar contexts -to protect First Amendment freedoms.19 - Rehnquisfs characterization of Black's opinions as motivated by "ideological sympathy" without adverting to this interpretation epitomizes the apparent constitu20
tional laxity which later became the target of liberal opponents.
Senate Judiciary Committee dissenters were explicit in urging rejection of Rehnquist's nomination:
16. Id.
17. 353 U.S. at 273 (emphasis added). In 1961, a majority of the Court sustained
a second refusal by the California Bar Committee to certify Konigsberg; however, the
majority and dissenting opinions indicate that the committee's action raised serious First
Amendment considerations. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 365 (1961); id. at 56
(Black, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J., dissenting in part on First Amendment grounds); id. at 80 (Brennan, J.,joined by Warren, C.J., dissenting on First
Amendment grounds).
18. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956), held that a college teacher
could not be discharged without a hearing for asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination before a legislative committee; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952), held that a state could not require its employees to swear that they had
not belonged to certain organizations designated as subversive.
19. Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of
Law, 53 Nw. U.L. RPv. 13, 28-30 (1958); Note, Due Process Limitations On Occupational Licensing, 59 VA. L. Rav. 1097, 1114-15 (1973).
20. Rehnquist later clarified the position taken in this article: "I would say that
I had no intention then, and certainly would not say now, that Justice Black, who authored the [Schwarej opinion, or the others who concurred with the opinion, wrote it
because they were sympathetic with Communism. I think the language I used was
meant to suggest that they sympathize with the plight of unpopular groups, such as Communists, and I certainly did not mean to suggest that this is an illegitimate sympathy,
but I did not feel that sympathy any more than any other sympathy ought to be read
into the Constitution." Hearings on the Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
28 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ConfirmationHearings].
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When it comes to dealing with civil liberties, Mr. Rehnquist uniformly takes a position which reflects the low value he places upon
concerns of equality and individual freedom. He consistently gives
these concerns far less weight than that to which they are entitled
by their high place in the Constitution of the United States and
21
their vital role in the fabric of contemporary American society.

To a large extent, the fears of those who opposed Rehnquist have
proven well-grounded. His opinions so far have shown little desire for
an active judicial role in support of civil liberties.
Freedom of Speech

Drawing the line between protected and prohibited speech has
long been a most difficult task for the Supreme Court. No one can
dispute -the value of freedom of expression to a society that seeks a
large measure of both political democracy and individual freedom.
However, speech may be used to incite action that the state can validly
prohibit, such as public violence, or may itself impinge upon legitimate
personal interests, such as privacy.2" This dilemma has traditionally
led to a balancing approach which requires -the Court to weigh the
competing interests of society and the individual. In several notable
opinions, Rehnquist has indicated his evaluation of these interests.
In Healy v. James23 a group of students sought to establish a local
chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) at the state-supported Central Connecticut State College, but the college president denied them recognition as a campus organization. Recognition was a
prerequisite both to use of campus facilities for meetings and to access
-to the campus bulletin board and school newspaper. The president
was not satisfied that the proposed local chapter would be independent
of the national SDS, which he believed had a philosophy of violence
and disruption in conflict with the college's declaration of student
rights.2" Speaking for eight members of the Court, Justice Powell
found that the presidentes decision violated the students' First Amendment rights insofar as it was based on an assumed relationship with the
21. SENATE JuDIcIARY COMMITTEE, NOMINATON oF WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, S.
ExEc. REP. No. 92-16, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. at 44 (1971) (minority report).
22. For a superb analysis of the conflict between speech and privacy, see Haiman,
Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L. Rnov. 153
(1972).
23. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
24. The student bill of rights purported to impose no limitations on the right of
college student organizations to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them,
but also stated that students had no right to: (1) deprive others of the opportunity to
speak or be heard; (2) invade the privacy of others; (3) damage the property of others;
(4) disrupt the regular and essential operation of the college; or (5) interfere with the
rights of others. Id. at 189.
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national SDS, was a result of disagreement with the group's philosophy,
or was a consequence of fear of disruption. However, Justice Powell
carefully pointed out that a proper basis for nonrecognition might be
afforded if the local chapter refused to comply with a rule requiring
them to abide by reasonable campus regulations. Since the record was
unclear regarding the existence of such a rule or the local chapter's intent to observe it, the Court remanded the case for resolution of these
issues.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist elaborated upon the
scope of the regulations which a state-supported college could validly
impose upon its students. Taking the majority to task for treating prior
First Amendment cases as "fungible goods,"2 5 he asserted that a careful
reading of precedent revealed two relevant principles. First, the government as school administrator may impose upon student speech regulations that would be constitutionally impermissible if applied ,to all citizens. 6 Second, a constitutional distinction may be drawn between
criminal punishment and administrative or disciplinary sanctions, even
27
though the same speech interest is affected.
There is an undeniable difference between the imposition of
criminal and administrative sanctions. When administrative regulations are used only to control the time, place, and manner of speech,
they pose little ,threat -to freedom of expression. In a college setting,
however, administrative action can readily be used to regulate the content of speech as well. Since effective education requires both classroom discipline and an opportunity for private study and -reflection, the
government's interest in preserving order on college campuses is obvious. Yet there is a tension between the maintenance of an academic
atmosphere and unqualified freedom of speech which Justice Rehnqust left unresolved. His exclusive emphasis on the constitutional implications of the role of -the government as college administrator suggests, however, that his view of speech on the college campus is
markedly different from that expressed by Justice Powell for the major-

ity:
[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that,
because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment
protections should apply with less force on college campuses than
in the community at large. Quite to the contrary, "[tihe vigilant
25. Id. at 203.
26. Id.; cf. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). Rehnquist's majority decision
rested primarily on the rationale that Congress has greater power to restrict freedom of
speech in the military than in society at large.
27. 408 U.S. at 203; accord, Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574
(1968).
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protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in
the community of American schools."28
Further evidence of Rehnquist's point of view regarding expression on campus can be found in his dissent in Papishv. Board of Curators.29 A graduate student in the University of Missouri School of
Journalism was expelled for violating the bylaws of the board by distributing on campus a newspaper containing "indecent speech."30 The
particular paper in question was found unacceptable in -two respects.
It displayed a political cartoon depicting policemen raping the Statute
of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice captioned "With Liberty and
Justice for All." There was also an article entitled "M ----f-...
Acquitted," which discussed the trial of a New York City youth who was a
member of an organization known as "Up Against the Wall, M----fIn a per curiam opinion, the Court ordered Papish reinstated, concluding that she had been expelled "because of the disapproved content
of the newspaper rather than the time, place, or manner of its distribution."3 2 The majority cited Healy for the proposition that dissemination of offensive ideas on a state university campus "may not be shut
off in the name alone of 'conventions of decency.' "33
Rehnquist was joined in dissent by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun.3 4 Even granting that a criminal prosecution of Papish
would be unconstitutional, Rehnquist relied on the distinction he had
drawn in Healy between criminal prosecution and administrative sanctions to sustain the challenged expulsion. Rehnquist's opinion was
probably influenced by his view that Papish's newspaper contained
"lewd and obscene" language 35 not protected under the First Amendment. Thus, he was not faced with the presumably more difficult case
of the validity of administrative sanctions leveled against expression of
higher intrinsic merit. Nevertheless, Rehnquist's opinion demonstrates
that he is more prepared than a majority of the Court to defer to value
judgments made by college administrators.
Justice Rehnquist's primary concern in this area is that if taxpayers
and legislators are "told by the Court that their only function is to sup28. 408 U.S. at 180. Powell believes that schools can adequately maintain order
by regulating conduct and need not infringe upon advocacy.
29. 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 667-68.
32. Id. at 670 (footnote omitted).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 673.
35. Id. at 676.
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ply tax money for the operation of the university, [their] 'disenchantment' may reach such a point that they doubt the game is worth the
candle."3 6 In this sense, publicly-supported colleges pose a serious dilemma. On the one hand, taxpayers will always demand control over
institutions supported by public funds. On the other hand, education
as we know it is vitally linked to freedom of expression for students
and teachers alike. Recognizing that generalizations inevitably distort
truth to some degree, it is still fair to say that Rehnquist seems most
concerned that a disenchanted populace will render the question of expression moot by disinheriting public colleges. In contrast, the liberal
wing of the Court perceives the principal threat to be the stifling of
expression on college campuses which could render them incapable of
serving as marketplaces for ideas."
An interesting counterpoint to Rehnquist's dissent in Papish is his
dissent in the companion cases of Rosenfeld v. New Jersey,33 Lewis
9 and Brown v. Oklahoma.40 All three of these cases
v. New Orleans,"
involved criminal convictions for the public use of "offensive words."
Mrs. Lewis had shouted that the officers arresting her son were "g-d---m ---f---- police."' 41 Mr. Brown also publicly labelled policemen
f-......" in the course of an address to a political meeting to which
'm ---he had been invited .to present the Black Panther viewpoint.4 2 In a
diatribe launched at a public school board meeting attended by more
than 150 persons, including approximately 40 children and 25 women,
" on four occasions to deMr. Rosenfeld used the expletive "m .. ------scribe the teachers, community, school system, school board, country,
county, and town.43 A majority of the Supreme Court reversed the
convictions of all three appellants and remanded the cases 44 for reconsideration in light of Gooding v. Wilson. 45 In essence the Court was
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 678.
See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972).
408 U.S. 901 (1972).

39.

408 U.S. 913 (1972).

40. 408 U.S. 914 (1972). For Rehnquist's consolidated dissent in all three cases,
see id. at 909. Rehnquist and Blackmun joined Chief Justice Burger's consolidated dissent. Id. at 902.
41. 408 U.S. at 909 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 911.
43. Id. at 910.
44. 408 U.S. at 901-02, 913-14.
In Gooding, a criminal statute prohibiting use of "op45. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
probrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace" was held
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Rosenfeld and Brown were also to be reconsidered in light of Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In Cohen no compelling state
interest was shown to justify the application of a criminal statute to a public display
of offensive speech.
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suggesting that all of the statutes under which the convictions were obtained were unconstitutionally overbroad.
Since the elements so important to Rehnquist in Healy and
Papish-the use of administrative sanctions by the government acting
as educator-were absent from these cases, one might expect him to
take a more solicitous approach in weighing the rights of the defendants. However, Rehnquist, joined by Burger and Blackmun, wrote a
short dissenting opinion arguing that:
I would not deny to these States the power to punish language
of the sort used here by appropriate legislation. Appellant Lewis'
words to the police officers were "fighting words," and those of appellants Rosenfeld and Brown were "lewd and obscene" and "profane" as those terms are used
46 in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
the leading case in the field.
As to the overbreadth problem apparently so crucial -to the majority,
Rehnquist asserted that it could not "fairly be said" that the statutes
in question unduly infringed upon protected speech. 47 His approach
to the overbreadth issue is representative of the current view of a majority of the Court which limits the doctrine in cases involving speech
and conduct by requiring that overbreadth be substantial before a
statute will be struck down.4
Perhaps even more significant than his treatment of the overbreadth issue is Rehnquist's summary 'application of Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire" -to the speech in question. On its face, the epithet Mrs.
Lewis hurled at the policemen arresting her son falls conveniently under the "fighting words" rubric. But cam it really b6 said that a
woman's cursing of a grown man is likely to lead to a physical breach
of the peace? Such an argument proves to be even less persuasive
when that man is a police officer "trained to exercise a higher degree
of restraint than the average citizen." 50 Yet Rehnquist was quick to
attach the "fighting words" label without analyzing the realities of the
situation. His conclusion that the words spoken by Rosenfeld and
Brown were "lewd and obscene' is similarly unsupported by analysis.
In view of the difficulty the Court has experienced in defining obscenity," this facile characterization is particularly questionable.
46. 408 U.S. at 911 (citation omitted).

47. Id. at 913.
48. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601 (1973); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers

Union, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
49. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
50. 408 U.S. at 913 (Powell,J.,
concurring inthe result).
51. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v.Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73-114 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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Justice Powell's opinions in these cases demonstrate that mere
classification is not the only possible approach to "offensive speech"
cases. Powell analyzed the circumstances involved in each case and
decided that the crucial element in the balancing process was the audience to which the words were directed. In Lewis, Powell concluded
that "fighting words" were not involved since the cursing was directed
at policemen trained to exercise self-restraint. 52 In Brown, he noted
that "language of the character charged might well have been anticipated by [an] audience" assembled specifically to hear the Black Panther viewpoint.5
In contrast, Powell found Rosenfeld guilty of a
"gross abuse of the respected privilege in this country of allowing every
citizen to speak his mind."5 4 He was unprepared to uphold on First
Amendment grounds what he viewed as a totally unwarranted and
crude verbal assault on an unwilling audience which included women
and children.5 5 One can question Powell's emphasis on the nature
of the audience as delimiting a speaker's freedom of expression; however, -he must be credited with balancing -the perceived interests in an
open and intelligible manner. Rehnquist's more cursory approach suffers badly by comparison.
In Healy, Papish, Lewis, Brown, and Rosenfeld, Rehnquist was
a dissenter. Although these opinions reveal much about his approach
to the First Amendment, they do not reflect the views of a majority
of the Court. His opinion in California v. LaRue,56 however, was
joined by five of his brethren and thus may well contain clues as to
where the Court is heading in First Amendment jurisprudence.
During investigatory hearings, the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control received reports of widespread illegal sexual
activity 57 occurring in and near "topless" and "bottomless" bars located
throughout the state. The department issued regulations prohibiting
52.

408 U.S. at 914 (Powell, J., concurring in the result).

53.

Id. at 914.

54.
55.

Id. at 904 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"One of the hallmarks of a civilized society is the level and quality of dis-

course. We have witnessed in recent years a disquieting deterioration in standards of
taste and civility in speech. For the increasing number of persons who derive satisfaction from vocabularies dependent upon filth and obscenities, there are abundant opportunities to gratify their debased tastes. But our free society must be flexible enough to
tolerate even such a debasement provided it occurs without subjecting unwilling audiences to the type of verbal nuisance committed in this case. The shock and sense of
affront, and sometimes the injury to mind and spirit, can be as great from words as from
some physical attacks." Id. at 909.
56. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
57. Such activity included oral sex between customers and entertainers, prostitution, sexual assaults, and indecent exposure.

Id. at 111.
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explicitly sexual live entertainment and films in establishments licensed to dispense liquor by the drink. Bar owners and entertainers
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and a three-judge district court
held that the regulations unconstitutionally restricted freedom of expression.5 s
Rehnquist's opinion for -the Court reversed the lower tribunal and
sustained the facial constitutionality of the regulations. While acknowledging that the regulations reached some entertainment which would
otherwise be protected by the First Amendment, 59 he found that the
state's power to regulate liquor under the Twenty-first Amendment 0
made it unnecessary to determine whether the prohibited entertainment was obscene or so linked with conduct as to be subject to restriction.6" Rehnquist noted that although the Twenty-first Amendment
does not supersede all other constitutional provisions in the area of
liquor regulations, "the case for upholding state regulation in the area
covered by the Twenty-first Amendment is undoubtedly strengthened
by that enactment ... *"62 This line of reasoning led to the application of both a presumption of validity and -the rationality standard
normally reserved to test the validity of economic regulations. Not surprisingly, the regulations passed constitutional muster under this standard of review.
The breadth of LaRue's likely future application is problematical. 3 If the decision is construed as relevant only to Twenty-first
Amendment cases, its impact will be minimal. On the other hand, one
commentator has suggested that LaRue "might be taken to indicate that
First Amendment values, rather than being given a 'preferred position,'
must be placed on more equal terms with other constitutional mandates
such as those of the twenty-first amendment. 64 Evidence supporting
this position can be found in Rehnquist's apparent willingness to deny
constitutional protection to certain modes of expression and in his
avoidance of the overbreadth doctrine.
58. LaRue v. California, 326 F. Supp. 348 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
59. 409 U.S. at 118.
60. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides: "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or Possession of
the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
61. See 409 U.S. at 116.
62. Id. at 115.
63. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973). In this case a procedural
due process challenge to denial of renewal of liquor licenses of establishments offering
nude entertainment was remanded for reconsideration in light of LaRue, inter alia.
64. Note, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1, 137 (1973)
[hereinafter cited 1972 Supreme Court].
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For example, Rehnquist characterized the activities at issue in LaRue as "bacchanalian revelries" which partook "more of gross sexuality
-than of communication" and suggested that a performance by a "scantily clad ballet troupe in a theater" would enjoy greater constitutional
protection.6" This distinction was not supported by constitutional principles and apparently rested on the unarticulated premise -that ballet
is more serious and important to society than bottomless dancing. This
ad hoc approach, involving subjective appraisal of the constitutional
status of various means of expression, may significantly discourage the
exercise of First Amendment rights through less orthodox forms of
communication. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine may be severely
curtailed. Justice Marshall, in dissent, was "startled" by the majority's
suggestion that the regulations in LaRue were facially valid even
though specific future applications might produce concrete problems of
constitutional dimensions. 6 Marshall noted that such an interpretation
67
flew in the face of traditional overbreadth analysis:
Nor is it relevant that the State here "sought to prevent [bacchanalian revelries]" rather -than performances by "scantily clad ballet
'troupe[s]." Whatever the State "sought" to do, the fact is that
these regulations cover both these activities. And it should be
clear that a praiseworthy legislative motive can no more rehabilitate an unconstitutional
statute than an illicit motive can invalidate
6
a proper statute. 8
The recent decision in Spence v. Washington69 indicates that a
majority of the Court has not yet adopted Justice Rehnquist's relaxed
standard of First Amendment scrutiny. Spence involved the conviction
for "improper use""0 of the American flag of a student who had hung
from his apartment window a flag bearing a peace symbol fashioned
from black -tape. The Court reversed the conviction, finding no state
interest sufficient to support application of the criminal statute to appellant's protected form of expression. In dissent, Rehnquist asserted that
the majority failed to recognize the state's interest in preserving the
symbolic integrity of -the flag by withdrawing it "from the roster of
65. 409 U.S. at 118.
66. Id. at 125 n.3.
67. One commentator has suggested that the failure to apply the doctrine in LaRue
might be rationalized under the substantial overbreadth doctrine subsequently developed
in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 1972 Supreme Court, supra note 64,
at 139-40. In Broadrick, the Court stated: "[Plarticularly where conduct and not
merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only
be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep." 413 U.S. at 615.
68. 409 U.S. at 125 n.3.
69. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
70. Id. at 407.
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materials that may be used as a background for communications. '71
Having identified the true nature of the state's countervailing interest,
Rehnquist concluded that the statute was a reasonable limitation on
speech insofar as its inhibitory effect was merely incidental72 and neutral with respect to any expressive purpose behind the proscribed conduct. 73
Spence highlights the contrast between the current approaches to
First Amendment balancing which should offer some comfort for those
who fear further erosion of the preferred position of freedom of expression. Rehnquist's analysis, joined in Spence by Chief Justice Burger

and Justice White, illustrates not only a greater willingness to accept
an asserted state interest behind limitations on speech, but also a lesser
tolerance for diverse forms of expression. 74 While a majority of the
Court continues to assess independently the competing interests in free

speech cases, Rehnquist seems ready -to uphold any governmental purpose unrelated to suppression of expression, particularly where the
regulated conduct is not pure speech. Thus, although the overbreadth
doctrine has been limited, 75 it appears that a majority of the justices
is not yet prepared to abandon the Court's role as arbiter of the constitutional balance between individual and state interests mandated by the
First Amendment.
Voting Rights

The landmark decision in Baker v. Carr76 in 1962 launched the
Warren Court onto the political seas of reapportionment.77 Two years
later, in Wesberry v. Sanders,78 the Court relied on article I, section
2 of the Constitution7 9 in ordering Georgia to redraw its congressional
71. Id. at 423.
72. Id. at 417.
73. Id. at 422-23.
74. Noting that "even protected speech may be subject to reasonable limitation
when important countervailing interests are involved," Rehnquist argued that application
of the statutory restriction was merely an incidental limitation on free speech analogous
to the prevention of painting on public buildings. Id. at 416-17. The majority, on
the other hand, emphasized that the petitioner's manner of expression was direct and
consistent with conventional, symbolic use of flags and concluded that the "improper
use" statute, as applied to appellant's conduct, constituted a direct infringement of free
expression. See id. at 414-15 &n.8.
75. See notes 48 & 67 supra.
76. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
77. Former Chief Justice Warren deemed the decision in Baker v. Carr to be even
more important than that in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). N.Y.
Times, July 6, 1968, at 42, col. 1.
78. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
79. That section provides that: "The House of Representatives shall be composed
of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States... :2
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district lines so that as "nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's. 8 0 Shortly
thereafter, -the Court in Reynolds v. Sims"' invoked the equal protection clause to require that states make a good faith effort to structure
state legislative districts to be "as nearly of equal population as is practicable."8 2 At the heart of these "one man-one vote" decisions was
the premise that every citizen has a fundamental interest in an equally
weighted vote. 3 Given the importance of this interest, the Court for
a decade carefully scrutinized any districting scheme which diluted the
votes of some citizens.8 4 This strict scrutiny, however, has been significantly curtailed in several recent opinions.
Writing for a majority of the Court in Mahan v. Howell, 5 Rehnquist adopted a relaxed standard of review of state legislative districting
and upheld a Virginia reapportionment plan which resulted in a maximum variation from the ideal district of approximately 16 percent. He
relied on the fact that state redistricting is governed by the equal protection clause, not by article I, section 2, and noted that the Court had
previously suggested that "more flexibility [is] constitutionally permisThis
ible with respect to state legislative reapportionment .... .I'l
increased flexibility led Rehnquist to frame the judicial inquiry not in
terms of "governmental necessity," but rather in terms of what a state
may "rationally consider. 81 7 In applying this standard, he noted that
deviation from the ideal district was due to the state's attempt to
preserve the integrity of preexisting political subdivision lines. He
found this attempt to be rational since it furthered the purpose of
facilitating enactment of statutes of purely local concern and preserved
for voters in political subdivisions a voice in state legislation on local
matters. In summary, he reasoned that:
[n]either courts nor legislatures are furnished any specialized calipers that enable them to extract from the general language of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the mathematical formula that establishes what range of percentage deviations is permissible, and what is not. 8
One can find much to criticize in Rehnquist's Mahan opinion.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
Preisler,
85.
86.
87.
88.

376 U.S. at 8.
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 577.
See id. at 561, 568; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964).
See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Kirkpatrick v.
394 U.S. 526 (1969).
410 U.S. 315 (1973).
Id. at 321.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 329.
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First, he read previous reapportionment decisions as drawing a clear
distinction between congressional and state legislative districting. Such
a distinction is far from apparent. Indeed, the decision which he cited
as most clearly supporting his analysis, Abate v. Mundt,"9 does not purport to give lesser scrutiny to local redistricting at all. 90 Second, the
distinction Rehnquist drew between article I, section 2 and the equal
protection clause does not support the enormous difference in result.
Not only are both clauses couched in vague terms, but, more importantly, the interpretation of these clauses by the Court in Wesberry and
Reynolds resulted in strikingly similar formulations. 91 Finally, it is
hard to justify under traditional two-tier equal protection analysis the
application of a "rationality" standard to a voting rights case. At least
since Reynolds, voting has been considered a "fundamental right" 2
which, under the equal protection clause, can be restricted only upon
a showing of a compelling state interest.
At least one commentator has concluded that even if the Court's
reasoning in Mahan is "flawed, it may well be that -theresults it reaches
are sensible." 93 In redefining the citizen's interest to be one in a "substantially equal rather than a precisely equal vote," ,the Court has found
a way to limit its involvement "in the inherently legislative and political
redistricting process to cases which threaten to divest majorities of political control." 94
While Mahan can be read as only a minor redefinition of the right
to vote, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District95 carries broader implications. The California Water Code98 provides for the formation of
water storage districts whose function is to acquire, store, and distribute
water to meet agricultural needs within a limited geographic area.
97
Water storage districts are granted all water rights within the distrit
and are given other special powers and privileges, such as condemna89. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
90. In Rockland County, New York, the town supervisors from each of the five
towns in the county also served as a five man board of county supervisors. In order
to preserve the dual role of these local legislators, the challenged districting plan divided
the county into five districts whose lines coincided with the boundaries of the five towns.
In this unique setting, the Court found the state's interest in preserving the century-old
system compelling. Id. at 185-87.
91. See text accompanying notes 80 & 82 supra.
92. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667, 670 (1966).
93. 1972 Supreme Court, supra note 64, at 93.
94. Id. at 93-94.
95. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
96. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 39000-48401 (West 1966).
97. Id. §§ 39061, 43158.
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tion9 8 and immunity from taxation. 99 The provisions challenged in Salyer limited the right to vote for the district's board of directors to persons owning land within the district' 0 and apportioned votes according
to the amount of land owned.' 0 ' Thus, residents not owning land
within the district were denied electoral participation, and small landowners were given only limited participation. Members of both groups
brought suit alleging that this system constituted a denial of equal protection.
Rehnquist's majority opinion began with the observation that previous decisions had left open the question of whether a state or local
government could permit preferential voting if the local elective unit
provides services which are distinct from normal governmental activities and which have a disproportionate effect upon different groups.' 02
In applying this dual-pronged exception, Rehnquist found for the water
storage district on two grounds. First, he determined that the district
performed special functions and provided "no other general public
services such as schools, housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal body."'' 0
Second, he noted that the activities of the district disproportionately affected landowners as a group, since they shared the economic burdens
and benefits connected with its operations. Thus, Rehnquist concluded that the California water storage district fell squarely within the
exception contemplated by previous cases and that preferential voting
was not per se unconstitutional.
The ,reasoning of the majority opinion was not confined to the special election exception; instead, Justice Rehnquist also assessed the relationship between the preferential voting system and the state's goal
of encouraging landowners to join water storage districts. As in Mahan, the most striking aspect of the Salyer opinion is its exclusive reliance on a rationality standard despite the fact that voting rights were
involved. 10 4 While application of the looser standard in Mahan did not
98. Id. §§ 43530-33.
99. Id. § 43508.
100. Id. § 41000.
101. Id. § 41001.
102. 410 U.S. at 727-28, citing Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56
(1970).
103. 410 U.S. at 728-29.
104. In Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), the Court, speaking through
Justice Rehnquist, held that state disenfranchisement of convicted felons who had completed their sentences and paroles did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision turned on a literal reading of section 2 of the amendment which apparently contemplates the disenfranchisement of those who participate in "rebellion, or other crime."
What is particularly noteworthy, however, is that the Court seized upon section 2 to de-
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lead to significant dilution of any individual's vote, in Salyer it resulted
in substantial disenfranchisement. The water district in Salyer was
responsible for flood control within its jurisdiction, and although Rehnquist dismissed this as an incidental function, experience had demonstrated its importance to all residents of the area. In 1969, one large
landowner blocked suggested flood control measures. District inaction
directly led to the flooding of thousands of acres of land and resulted
in injury to the owners, lessees, and residents of that land. 10 5 Thus,
control of this critical public service was placed in the hands of four
large landowning corporations, and individual residents were left with
no effective voice.Y6
Equal Protection
Throughout the 1960's the equal protection clause of -the Fourteenth Amendment was one of the Warren Court's principal weapons
of judicial intervention. The Court frequently struck down legislation
involving either "fundamental interests" or "suspect classifications."'" 7
Professor Gunther has written that the Burger Court's response to this
equal protection legacy has not been the wholesale retrenchment many
expected."'
Justice Rehnquist, however, has been less tolerant of
what he perceives as the- doctrinal error of using equal protection as
a constitutional engine for achieving social equality. He would instead
defer to all rational legislative line-drawing except when explicitly racial classifications are involved. 0 9
In a dissent in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,"10 Rehnquist set out his equal protection views at some length. In that case
the Court struck down a provision of the Louisiana workmen's compensation law which relegated unacknowledged illegitimate children to the
cide the case, thus rejecting the dissenting view of Marshall and Brennan that an evolving notion of equal protection should be used to protect the voting rights of even convicted felons. See id. at 74-77. Although Ramirez involved a rather particularized setting, it demonstrates once again that a majority of the Court no longer relies solely
on the strict two-tier standard of equal protection in voting rights cases.
105. See 410 U.S. at 737-38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 742.
107. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1972).
108. Id. at 10-11.
109. But cf. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972). Rehnquist joined a unanimous
opinion which invalidated a Kansas recoupment statute enabling the state to bring civil
proceedings to recover legal defense costs expended for indigent defendants. Justice
Powell's opinion for the Court was couched in terms of equal protection. The case
could also have been analyzed as an infringement of the right to counsel, and perhaps
this explains Rehnquist's vote.
110. 406 U.S. 164, 177 (1972).
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lesser status of "other dependents" rather than classifying them as
children."1 1 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell reasoned that the
inferior classification violated equal protection because it bore no significant relationship to the recognized purposes of recovery that workmen's compensation statutes are designed to serve.:" 2
Crucial to Rehnquist's dissent in Weber was his reliance on Justice
Miller's construction of the equal protection clause in The SlaughterHouse Cases,"' decided only five years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Miller had held that the clause was drafted solely
to protect blacks against racial discrimination by the states. Acknowledging the Court's departure from this view, Rehnquist characterized
the "new" equal protection as a judicially created "superstructure, awkwardly engrafted upon the Constitution itself." 1 4 He argued that the
Court's attempt to define fundamental rights and suspect classifications
could lead to "judicial exegesis over and above the commands of the
Constitution, in which values that cannot possibly have their source in
that instrument are invoked to either validate or condemn the countless
laws enacted by the various States."" 15
Justice Rehnquist's solution was to acknowledge Dandrige v. Williams" 6 not only as the controlling precedent, but also as a guide to
the proper analytical approach. Dandridge dealt with the administration
of public welfare assistance and thus involved the most basic economic
needs of the poor. The Court held that the wide latitude accorded
state legislatures by the equal protection clause was not limited to
statutes regulating business or industry. For Rehnquist, Dandridge
stood for the principle -that the "rational basis" test applied even to social welfare legislation.1 7 Given this standard of review, he concluded
that the provision in Weber was constitutionally permissible. He noted
first that the purpose of Louisiana's statutory scheme was to effectuate
the unarticulated intent of the decedent. Noting the rational presumption that a decedent would favor 'his parents over his first cousins,
Rehnquist argued that it would also be rational to presume a preference
111. Id. at 167-68.
112. Id. at 173. This opinion was Powell's foray with an intermediate equal protection standard. He stopped short of defining illegitimacy as a suspect classification
but scrutinized the statute more closely than a mere rationality standard would have
called for.
113. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
114. 406 U.S. at 179.
115. Id. at 182.
116. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
117. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 180 (1972).
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for legitimate children over unacknowledged illegitimate children. "18
He buttressed this by pointing out that -the statute, in many instances,
eliminated difficult problems of proof of paternity and thus served the
goal of administrative efficiency. Finally, he asserted that the statute

was a rational, although perhaps unwise, attempt by the state to foster
morality and responsible family relationships." 9
Rehnquist's other equal protection opinions follow -the line of
reasoning set forth in Weber.'

Once he determines that racial dis-

crimination is not involved, he examines only the rationality of the challenged statute or policy. As a practical matter, this is an abdication
of review. Legislation is deemed constitutional if the legislature might
have concluded that it was a reasonable means of regulation. Moreover, the legislature need not even specify reasons; if any are imaginable, the reviewing court will supply them. Such a limited view of the
12
Court's role frequently leaves Rehnquist standing alone in dissent.

Justice Rehnquist's willingness to apply the rationality standard in

nearly all situations is illustrated by his dissent in Cruz v. Beto. 22 In
that case, a prisoner alleged that 'he was being denied an opportunity
to practice his Buddhist faith in a manner comparable to that offered
other prisoners adhering to "conventional" religious precepts. His
basic complaint was that while others were allowed to use the prison
chapel for religious services, he was denied similar access. In a per
curiam opinion, the Court held that these allegations constituted a
colorable equal protection claim and remanded for a hearing and appropriate findings.
118. Id. at 183.
119. Id. at 184.
120. In New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 622 (1973), Rehnquist reemphasized the position he took in Weber that illegitimacy should not be a suspect classification. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973), he dissented
on the grounds relied on by the lower court which had in dictum stated that the compelling interest test was inapplicable to discrimination based on sex. Frontiero v. Laird,
341 F. Supp. 201, 206 n.2 (M.D. Ala. 1972). He dissented in Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973), on the basis that alienage should not be a suspect classification. Rehnquist argued there that the Court's special treatment of aliens was least defensible of all because in 11 places the Constitution expressly discriminates against them
and because aliens can escape their "status" by becoming citizens.
121. The one equal protection case in which Rehnquist wrote for a majority of the
Court was Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), which upheld a state's application
of percentage reduction factors to various categorical assistance programs. With a majority of the Court unwilling to find a racially discriminatory motive behind the state's
action, the rationality test of Dandridge was clearly applicable. But cf. United States
Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). See notes 126-33 & accompanying
text infra.
122. 405 U.S. 319, 323 (1972).
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In Weber, Rehnquist expressed the fear that in many equal protection cases the Court was reading its own values into the Constitution." 3 In Cruz this hardly seems to have been the case, given the
First Amendment's explicit guarantee of free exercise of religion. The
Constitution may say nothing about illegitimate children, but the Bill
of Rights expressly safeguards freedom of religion. Thus, to give
closer scrutiny to an alleged denial of religious freedom, even in an
equal protection setting, is clearly not to read values into the Constitution. Rehnquist, however, viewed Cruz strictly as a "prisoner" case
and stated that in striking the balance between prisoners' rights and
the necessary discretion of prison officials, he "would apply the rule
of deference to administrative discretion -that has been overwhelmingly
accepted in the courts of appeals.' 4 He based this rule on the
premise that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment "would doubtless be surprised to know -that convicts came within its ambit .
,
-

Although there is undoubtedly a need for considerable discretion
in prison administration, Rehnquist's summary treatment of the religious freedom claim cannot be supported solely by the fact that the
petitioner was a prisoner. It is easy to see why prisoners are, of necessity, less "free" than other citizens. It is much harder to understand
why Cruz ought not to be given access to the prison chapel, particularly
given the emphasis the Constitution places on free exercise of religion.
While Cruz demonstrates Rehnquist's firm adherence to the
rationality standard, his dissent in United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno12 1 illustrates how permissive this test really is. In order
to minimize the incidence of fraudulent claims, the Food Stamp Act
of 1964 denied assistance to any household which contained an individual who was unrelated to any other household member.'2 7 The government assumed that households containing unrelated persons were
more likely to abuse the program12 8 and that the relative instability of
such households made it more difficult to detect abuse. 12 9 In practical
123.

See text accompanying note 115 supra.

124.

405 U.S. at 325.

125. Id. at 326. The difficulty with this premise is that, on its face, the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to prisoners as well as all other persons. Surely even Rehnquist
would hold unconstitutional legislation which treated black prisoners differently from
white prisoners.
126.

413 U.S. 528, 545 (1973).

127. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970).
128. In Moreno Justice Douglas noted that the "unrelated person" provision of the
act was an attempt by Congress to exclude "hippy communes" from participating in the
food stamp program. 413 U.S. at 543 (Douglas, J., concurring).
129.

Id. at 535.
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effect, however, the provision disqualified many households in which
there was great need of assistance and little danger of abuse. For example, appellee Victoria Keppler's daughter required special instruction in a school for the deaf which was located in an area in which the
family could not afford to live. In an attempt to make ends meet, appellee agreed to share an apartment near the school with another
vwoman who, like appellee, was on public welfare. Since the two
women were unrelated, they no longer qualified for food stamps.' 3 0
The majority found that the "unrelated person" provision was not rationally related either to the stated purpose of the act or to any other
legitimate governmental interest:
[E]ven if we were -to accept as rational the Government's wholly
unsubstantiated assumptions concerning the differences between
"related" and "unrelated" households [with regard to fraud], we
still could not agree with the Government's conclusion that the denial of essential federal food assistance to all otherwise eligible
households containing unrelated131
members constitutes a rational effort to deal with these concerns.
Justice Rehnquist was unpersuaded by the majority's logic:
The Court's opinion would make a very persuasive congressional committee report arguing against the adoption of the limitation in question. Undoubtedly, Congress attacked the problem
with a rather blunt instrument and, just as undoubtedly, persuasive
arguments may be made that what we conceive to be its purpose
will not be significantly advanced by the enactment of the limitation. But questions such as this are for Congress, rather than
for this Court; our role is limited to the determination of whether
there is any rational basis on which Congress could decide that public funds made available under the food stamp program should not
go to a household containing an 3individual
who is unrelated to any
2
other member of the household.1
In analyzing the rationality of the provision, Rehnquist stated that Congress could reasonably choose to support only "some variation on the
33
family as we know it-a household consisting of related individuals"'
-to avoid supporting households formed solely to take advantage of the
food stamp program. Thus, Rehuquist was prepared to accept the unsubstantiated assumption that "unrelated" households were more likely
to abuse the program. Moreover, he was not moved by the harsh impact of the overinclusive limitation on many citizens living at bare subsistence levels (i.e., many nonabusers were precluded from participation). Rehnquist's position is persuasive insofar as the statutory ex130.
131.
132.
133.

For striking examples of the impact of the challenged provision, see id. at 532.
Id. at 535-36.
Id. at 545-46.
Id. at 546.
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clusion was arguably supportable on the basis of the government's assumptions. In reality, however, the majority adopted an intermediatelevel scrutiny to ensure that otherwise eligible households containing
unrelated members would not be denied an essential form of assistance.
For Rehnquist, such a departure from the traditional rationality standard constitutes an encroachment upon the legislative domain.
In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 4 the Court, once
again focusing on the importance of the benefit involved, invalidated
a one-year residency requirement for access to a state program of nonemergency medical care for indigent persons. Writing for the majority,
Justice Marshall reasoned that the denial of this "basic necessity of life"
penalized the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel and
thus warranted strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause. 13 5 In
a lone dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist argued that the eligibility
requirement was an insigificant deterrent to interstate travel and that
the controlling legal question was simply whether the state had acted
36
arbitrarily.'
Together, the Court's recent decisions in Moreno and Memorial
Hospital indicate that Rehnquist's exclusive reliance on the rationality
standard of equal protection has attracted few supporters. Judicial activism in the field of social welfare has survived through the Court's continued use of the two-tier system of analysis. Increasing emphasis on
the constitutional significance of "governmental privileges and benefits
necessary to basic sustenance"' 3 7 suggests that Rehnquist's limited approach to equal protection is not likely to become the dominant view
of the present Court. 8"
134. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
135. Id. at 259.
136. Id. at 288. "The legal question in this case is simply whether the State of
Arizona has acted arbitrarily in determining that access to local hospital facilities for
nonemergency medical care should be denied to persons until they have established residence for one year. The impediment which this quite rational determination has placed

on appellant Evaro's 'right to travel' is so remote as to be negligible: so far as the record indicates Evaro moved from New Mexico to Arizona three years ago and has remained ever since. The eligibility requirement has not the slightest resemblance to the
actual barriers to the right of free ingress and egress protected by the Constitution, and
struck down in cases such as Crandalland Edwards. And, unlike Shapiro, it does not
involve an urgent need for the necessities of life of a benefit funded from current revenues to which the claimant may well have contributed. It is a substantial broadening
of, and departure from, all these holdings, all the more remarkable for the lack of explanation which accompanies the result."
137. Id. at 256-59.

Id.

138. Also noteworthy is the fact that, with the exception of Chief Justice Burger
in Moreno, 413 U.S. at 545, none of the members of the Court joined Rehnquist's dissents in the equal protection cases discussed in this section.
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The "New" Due Process
In several recent cases, the Court has resorted to the due process
clause, rather than the equal protection clause, to overturn overinclusive statutory schemes. 13 9 At issue in Vlandis v. Kline"4 ° was Connecticut's system for determining the residency status for tuition purposes
of students enrolled in state universities. A state statute created an
irrebuttable presumption that a married person whose legal address was
outside the state at the time of application for admission remained a
nonresident as long as he was a student in Connecticut. 1 41 Justice
Stewart's opinion for the majority of the Court held that this statute violated due process because it denied an individual the opportunity to
present evidence that he was a bona fide resident entitled to in-state
rates. The Court in effect required that a determination of residency
status be made in each case.
Rehnquist was joined in dissent by Burger and Douglas. 42
Focusing on the practicalities of the situation, he found the statute a
rational means for differentiating between bona fide residents and
those whose residence resulted merely from a desire to attend a state
university. He pointed out how easy it would be to defraud a system
based on individualized determinations by registering to vote and by
procuring indicia of residency, such as a motor vehicle registration or
driver's license. Rehnquist concluded that some statutory presumption
must be used if a state "wishes to differentiate between those who have
paid taxes to the State over a period of years in order to support the
university, and those who simply come to the State in order to attend
the university."'143 Acknowledging that any presumption would of necessity have "rough edges," he failed to see why this factor alone would
make it unconstitutional.
In United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry,144 a companion to the Moreno case,' 43 the Court found another conclusive pre139. See generally Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1534 (1974).
140. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
141. The statute in question also imposed the presumption on single students who
were nonresidents at any time one year prior to their application for admission. Id. at

442.
142.

Id. at 463.

143. Id. at 465.
144. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
145. See text accompanying notes 126-33 supra. The Court did not discuss why
Moreno was decided under the equal protection clause, while Murry was governed by
due process. The provision challenged in Moreno could have also been viewed as establishing an irrebuttable presumption that unrelated households would abuse the food
stamp program. Conversely, the section at stake in Murry could have been analyzed
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sumption to be violative of due process. Section 5(b) of the Food
Stamp Act made a household ineligible for participation if it included
a person over eighteen who was claimed as a dependent child for federal tax purposes by a taxpayer who was not a member of an eligible
household. 146 The Court reasoned that a tax deduction taken for the
benefit of a parent is not a rational measure of the need of the different
household with which the child of the tax-deducting parent lives and
that the act denied due process because it did not permit a hearing to
show that the tax deduction was irrelevant to the needs of the household.
14 7
Once again Rehnquist dissented, insisting that Dandridge allowed a legislature to draw imperfect classifications in the area of economics and social welfare as long as there was some reasonable basis
for doing so.' 48 In Murry, he asserted that Congress had not employed a conclusive presumption but had "simply made a legislative decision that certain abuses which it conceived to exist in the program
as previously administered were of sufficient seriousness to warrant the
substantive limitation which it enacted."' 4 9 In assessing the rationality
of the limitation, he noted that by definition, the tax-deducting parent
was wealthy enough not to qualify for food stamps and was willing to
provide over one-half of the dependent's support. Rehnquist concluded that there was a rational, albeit imperfect, correlation between
these factors and the tax-deducting parent's provision of sufficient support to raise his dependent's household above food stamp eligibility
standards. 1 0
In the latest of this unique line of cases, Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,'5' the Court invalidated school board rules requiring a pregnant teacher to take a mandatory maternity leave commencing five months before the expected birth of the child. Justice Stewart
held that the challenged rules violated due process because they created a conclusive presumption that every teacher who was four months
pregnant was physically incapable of continuing her duties. He concluded that the state's interest in preserving continuity of instruction
would be served just as well if teachers were allowed to work as long
as establishing a classification rationally unrelated to the purposes of the program. The
differing analysis in these two cases amply demonstrates the doctrinal confusion of a

majority of the Court.
146. 413 U.S. at 509 n.1.
147.

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).

148. 413 U.S. at 522.
149. Id. at 524.
150. Id. at 525.
151. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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as they desired, provided they gave substantial advance notice of the
projected commencement date of their leave.1 52
In a powerful dissent which summarizes his view of this new due
process analysis, Rehnquist characterized Stewart's opinion as "another
quixotic engagement in his apparently unending war on irrebuttable
presumptions."' 153 With considerable justification, Rehnquist views the
new doctrine as a threat to the legislative process:
All legislation involves the drawing of lines, and the drawing of
lines necessarily results in particular individuals who are disadvantaged by the line drawn being virtually indistinguishable for many
purposes from those individuals who benefit from the legislative
classification. The Court's disenchantment with "irrebuttable presumptions," and its preference for "individualized determinations,"
is in the last analysis nothing
54 less than an attack upon the very notion of lawmaking itself.'
It is difficult to evalute the ultimate impact of Justice Stewart's crusade,
since the new due process has thus far been limited to cases involving
other substantial constitutional interests. For example, at the heart of
Vlandis was the right to travel. In Murry, the poverty of the plaintiffs
was a compelling factor. And LaFleur raised the spectre of sex discrimination. Resort to due process clearly permits the Court to break
out of the shackles of traditional two-tier equal protection analysis.1 5
The danger, however, is that the new doctrine has the potential for
sweeping application since its logic allows little room for principled limitation. As Rehnquist points out:
[T]he Court will have to strain valiantly in order to avoid having
today's opinion [La Fleur] lead -to the invalidation of mandatory
retirement statutes for governmental employees. In that event federal, state, and local governmental bodies will be remitted to the
task, thankless both for them and for the employees involved,
of
56
individual determinations of physical impairment and senility.'
Rehnquist's observations regarding Justice Stewart's new due process
are valid, and this is certainly one area in which Rehnqulst's sensitivity
152. Id. at 642.
153. Id. at 657. In a separate concurring opinion, which analyzed the case in
terms of equal protection, Justice Powell agreed with Rehnquist that "it is difficult to
see the terminus of the road upon which the Court has embarked under the banner of
'irrebuttable presumptions.'" Id. at 652.
154. Id. at 660.
155. Some decisions have identified the right to travel as a fundamental right. See,
e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972). Thus, the Vlandis result theoretically could have been reached under equal protection. However, the Vlandis majority
was prepared to accept a one-year residency requirement, an exception which would have
been hard to justify under previous right to travel cases such as Blumstein. Thus, the
due process approach offered more flexibility.
156. 414 U.S. at 659.
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to the legislative process ought eventually to carry the day.
The Rights of the Criminally Accused-Search and Seizure
When President Nixon nominated Rehnquist and Powell, he
placed particular emphasis on redressing what he perceived as a judicially-imposed imbalance between the "peace forces" and the "crime
forces."1'5 7 As it turned out, the president's hopes were not misplaced.
Constitutional criminal procedure has been the one area in which the
Burger Court has clearly turned its back on Warren Court precedent.
With Justice White frequently joining the four Nixon appointees to
form a majority, an increasing number of decisions now favor the prosecution. A unifying theme of many of these decisions is the increased
trust which the Court is willing to place in governmental entities, most
notably the police. 58 Given Rehnquist's overall deference to legislative and executive action, the greatest number of his majority opinions
are written in criminal procedure cases. This section will focus on
three of Rehnquist's Fourth Amendment decisions. These opinions
not only represent significant developments in search and seizure jurisprudence, they also contain many of the recurring themes of his criminal procedure opinions in general.
In Adams v. Williams, 59 Rehnquist sustained a conviction both for
illegal possession of a handgun found during a "stop and frisk" and for
possession of narcotics discovered during a full search incident to the
weapons arrest. A police officer on patrol in Bridgeport, Connecticut,
at 2:15 a.m. was told by an informant that an individual seated in a
nearby car had narcotics in the automobile and a revolver concealed
at his waist. The officer approached the car and asked Williams to
open the door; but the defendant instead merely rolled down the window. The officer then reached in and removed a fully loaded revolver
from the defendant's waist. Williams was arrested for unlawful possession of the pistol, and a subsequent search of the car turned up twelve
ounces of heroin. Williams later attacked his conviction on the basis
that the gun and the narcotics were the fruits of an unconstitutional frisk
and therefore should not have been admitted as evidence against him.
Rehnquist began his opinion in the case by adopting the two-step
analysis developed by Justice Harlan:' 6 ° determining first whether
157. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1971, at 24, col. 3. See note 196 infra.
158. See Note, Restricting the Scope of Searches Incident to Arrest: United
States v. Robinson, 59 VA. L. REv. 724, 746-48 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Restricting
Searches].
159. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
160. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31-34 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Sibron
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 70-79 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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there were reasonable grounds for the forcible stop of the suspect, and
second, whether there were reasonable grounds for any subsequent
frisk. Rehnquist found that that the informant's tip had sufficient "indicia of reliability"'1 61 to provide reasonable grounds for the stop. He
also concluded that there were reasonable grounds for the frisk, in that
the informant had stated that Williams was carrying a gun and that the
defendant had rolled down his window instead of opening the door as
requested.1 62 Having found both the stop and the frisk to be permissible, Rehnquist next held that discovery of the gun gave probable cause
for arrest and that the search of the car was lawful as incident to the
arrest. Therefore, both the gun and the narcotics were admissible evidence and not the tainted fruit of an unconstitutional search.
What is particularly notable about Rehnquist's reasoning is his reliance solely on factors which support the reasonableness of the police
officer's action without any discussion of countervailing elements. For
example, he concluded that the tip was sufficiently reliable to justify
a stop because the informant was known personally to the officer, had
provided him with information in the past, and was actually present at
the scene.' 63 As Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent, this ignores the fact that the only tip which the informant had previously given
the officer had been incorrect.' 6 4 Moreover, Rehnquist found that
mere possession of a gun gave probable cause to arrest for possession
of a gun without a permit. Once again Marshall took issue with this
finding, pointing out that the officer made no attempt to ascertain
whether Williams possessed a permit before making the arrest.' 6 5 It
is clear that Rehnquist is unprepared to scrutinize carefully all aspects
of a case in order to find evidence of police misconduct. He starts with
the basic presumption that policemen will act in good faith, and if there
are any facts to support the reasonableness of the police action taken,
he will uphold it.
Further evidence of Rehnquist's approach can be found in Cady
v. Dombrowski."0 The defendant had a one-car accident near a small
Wisconsin town while driving a rented car. When the police arrived
at the scene, they arrested the defendant for drunken driving and had
the wrecked car towed to a garage. Believing the defendant to be a
Chicago policeman, the arresting officers made a warrantless search of
161. 407 U.S. at 147.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 147-48.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 156-57.
Id. at 160-61.
413 U.S.433 (1973).
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the car the next day in an attempt to recover the defendant's missing
service revolver. Instead of the revolver, they found several bloodied
items in the trunk which were later used as evidence to convict the defendant of first-degree murder. On appeal, the defendant argued that
the warrantless search was a violation of the Fourth Amendment and
that the seized evidence was inadmissible.
Rather than analyzing whether the police could have readily procured a warrant, Rehnquist's majority opinion focused instead on the
reasonableness of the search. He emphasized that the search was of
a car, not a private home; that the police had already exercised a form
of custody over the car by having it towed; and that the search was motivated by a concern for the safety of persons who might be endangered
if an intruder removed the revolver from the trunk. All of these arguments are makeweights in the classic sense. The actual underlying
premise lies in a most revealing passage:
While perhaps in a metropolitan area the responsibility to the general public might have been discharged by the posting of a police
guard during the night, what might be normal police procedure in
such an area may be neither normal nor possible in Kewaskum,
Wisconsin. The fact that the protection of the public might, in the
abstract, have been accomplished by "less intrusive"
means does
1 7
not, by itself, render the search unreasonable.
Rehnquist thus rejects an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
which would impose uniform requirements on the police. In his view,
it is unnecessary to construct a neutral barrier between police and citizen by means of a broad construction of the warrant clause. Instead,
Rehnquist urges that an ad hoc, subjective reasonableness test is not only
constitutional but is also essential to enable small-town police to protect
68
the public.1
United States v. Robinson'6 0 demonstrates how engrained the pre167. Id. at 447.
168. Compare id. at 433-54, with Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). In
Tucker, the Court ruled that evidence obtained as a result of a pre-Mirandainterrogation
conducted without the Miranda warning requirements could be used by the prosecution
in a post-Mirandatrial. Rehnquist, writing for the majority, analyzed the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination issue by comparing "the facts in this case with the historical circumstances underlying the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination .... ." 417
U.S. at 444. As one commentator has pointed out: "This mode of analysis effectively
undercuts Miranda'sefforts to provide clear constitutional guidelines for police behavior
and to expand the scope of the fifth amendment privilege. Thus, the requirement of
police compliance with Miranda appears to be reduced by Tucker to one factor to be
considered in determining whether, within the 'totality of circumstances,' the statement
was voluntary." Note, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. RFv. 13,
200-01 (1974).
169. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
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sumption has become in current criminal procedure decisions that public officials will respect constitutional limits to their authority. In Robinson, the defendant was arrested for driving with a revoked permit and
for obtaining a permit by misrepresentation. Because the former offense required a custodial arrest, the policeman conducted the full field
search mandated by standard police procedures. The officer felt an
object in the breast pocket of Robinson's jacket, removed it, and discovered a wadded up cigarette package which contained fourteen capsules of heroin. Robinson maintained that the full-blown search incident to the traffic arrest was a violation of the Fourth Amendment,
and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
agreed. 170 The Supreme Court reversed this decision.
Writing for the majority, Rehmquist produced one of the analytically weakest opinions he has authored to date. Since Robinson was
to be taken into custody, the police obviously had a great interest in
making sure that he was carrying no weapons. The officer, however,
removed the cigarette package, not on the belief that it was a weapon,
but because standard police practices required him to examine the contents of an arrestee's pockets. Moreover, even assuming the officer
was justified in seizing the package as a potential weapon, his interest
in self-protection only required that he remove it from the arrestee's
possession and not that he examine its contents.' 71 Yet Rehnquist did
not even discuss the possibility of a less intrusive search. Instead, he
cited numerous cases which do not limit the scope of searches of the
person incident to arrest, even while acknowledging that virtually all
previous statements in this area are dicta.' 72 He then concluded:
A police officer's determination as to how and where to search the
person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick
ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require
to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step
in the search. . . . It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a
lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
but is also a "reasonable" search under -thatAmendment.' 7 3
An unspoken premise lies behind the difference in the results
reached by the circuit court and the Supreme Court. Speaking for the
lower court, Judge Wright expressed concern about the propensity of
170. 471 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en bane). For a comprehensive analysis
of the circuit court's opinion, see Restricting Searches, supra note 158.
171. 471 F.2d at 1089-90 n.9.

172. 414 U.S. 218, 230.
173.

Id. at 235.
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the police to use arrests for minor offenses as pretexts to search for
evidence of more serious crimes. 1 74 Given an increased confidence in
the conduct of police, this is the sort of concern that a majority of the
Court no longer shares. Moreover, Rehnquist's opinion in Robinson carries overtones of judicial efficiency as well as trust of public officials.
The Court rejected an approach which would require a detailed analysis
of reasonableness in each case-once a legal, custodial arrest is made,
a full search of the arrestee is permissible. This rule not only provides
an easy guideline for the police to follow but also limits the issues to
be litigated. It is interesting that the twin principles of trust and efficiency coalesced in Robinson. In Cady, 175 on the other hand, Rehnquist opted for a less efficient approach-i.e., case-by-case determination of reasonableness-in order to give the police maximum leeway.
Thus, it would appear that the impulse to afford police a wider latitude
of action is even more strongly engrained than the desire to increase
judicial efficiency.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist and Property Rights
During Rehnquist's confirmation hearings, Senator Tunney elicited an intriguing statement from him concerning his views on property
rights:
I certainly am not prepared to say, as a matter of personal philosophy, that property rights are necessarily at the bottom of the
scale. Justice Jackson, for whom I worked, commented shortly before his death that the framers had chosen to join together life, liberty, and property, and he did not feel they should be separated.
I think property rights are actually a very important form of individual rights. On the other hand, I am by no means prepared
to say that a property right must not on some occasion-and I am
again speaking personally and not in any sense of the Constitution
or statutory construction-but certainly when a legislative decision
is made that a property right must give way to what may be called
a human right176
or an individual right, that may frequently be the
correct choice.
Statements such as this, coupled with Rehnquist's avowed political conservatism, might suggest that property rights would occupy a relatively
elevated position in his opinions as a Supreme Court justice. 7 7 Up to
174. See 471 F.2d at 1088 & n.3, 1108; Restricting Searches, supra note 158, at 746.
175. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
176. Confirmation Hearings,supra note 20, at 77.
177. In June, 1964, Rehnquist, then practicing law in Phoenix, Arizona, opposed
a local public accommodations ordinance before an open meeting of the Phoenix city
council. Speaking on his own behalf, Rehnquist stated: "I am a lawyer without a client

tonight. I am speaking only for myself. I would like to speak in opposition to the proposed ordinance because I believe that the values it sacrifices are greater than the values

February 19751

JUSTICE REHNQUIST

this point, however, there is no solid evidence of such a trend.
In Laird v. Nelms, 178 the plaintiff sued the government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for recovery of damage to his home
allegedly resulting from a sonic boom caused by an Air Force plane.
The trial court found no negligence in either the planning or execution
of the training flight, and Nelms's case was consequently reduced to
the theory of strict liability for ultrahazardous activity. In a brief majority opinion, Rehnquist cited Dalehite v. United States, 9 for the proposition that the government could not be held strictly or absolutely liable under the FTCA. In addition, Rehnquist pointed to the failure
of Congress to amend the act after Dalehite as indicating approval of
the interpretation given the act in that case.
The opinion in Nelms is certainly not the work of a justice who
is eager to find new ways to protect property rights. As Justice Stewart's dissent pointed out, 180 Dalehite could have been distinguished to
allow recovery in NeIms. Such a result would not have done violence
to the language of the FTCA, which expressly permits recovery for
"wrongful" acts.':' In Nelms, the government deliberately undertook
training missions which placed property in jeopardy. These missions
undoubtedly were justifiable in the name of national defense. This
does not, however, mitigate the wrong done when isolated individuals
are left uncompensated as a result of activities undertaken for the benefit of society as a whole. 8 2
In two "just compensation" cases decided during the 1972 Term,
Rehnquist demonstrated once again that his definition of constituwhich it gives. I take it that we are no less the land of the free than we are the land
of the equal and so far as the equality of all races [is] concerned insofar as public governmental bodies, treatment by the Federal, State or Local government is concerned, I
think there is no question. But it is the right of anyone, whatever his race, creed or
color to have that sort of treatment and I don't think there is any serious complaint
that there in Phoenix today such a person doesn't receive that sort of treatment from
government bodies. When it comes to the use of private property, that is the comer
drugstore or the boarding house or what have you ....
Here you are talking about
a man's private property and you are saying, in effect, that people shall have access to
that man's property whether he wants it or not. Now there have been other restrictions
on private property. There have been zoning ordinances and that sort of thing, but I
venture to say that there has never been this sort of assault on the institution where
you are told, not what you can build on your property, but who can come on your property." Id. at 305.
178. 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
179. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
180. See 406 U.S. at 807-08.
181. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1970).
182. See generally Note, Utility, Fairness and the Takings Clause: Three Perspectives on Laird v. Nelms, 59 VA. L. REv. 1034 (1973).
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tionally protected property rights is far from expansive. Since 1919,
the Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Company had been conducting grain elevator operations on land adjacent to the tracks of a
railroad, occupying the land under a series of successive leases from
the railroad. Over the years, Almota had made substantial improvements which had useful lives in excess of the remaining lease term.
With seven and one half years left to run on the current lease, the
United States contracted to acquire the underlying fee from the railroad
and began condemnation proceedings against Almota. In Almota
FarmersElevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 8 the government
contended that just compensation for a leasehold interest was the fair
market value of the legal rights actually possessed by the lessee and
that no consideration should be given to the fact that Almota had constructed improvements with the expectation that its lease would be renewed. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the government
as condemnor should be viewed as any other purchaser and that, accordingly, just compensation is measured by what a willing buyer would pay
for the lease with improvements, taking into account the possibility that
the lease might be renewed.
Rehnquist, joined by Burger, Blackmun, and White, made two arguments in dissent. First, he asserted that the mere expectation of renewal of a lease is not a vested, enforceable property interest within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 18 4 Second, he reasoned that by
purchasing the fee from the railroad, the government had merely made
nonrenewal of the lease a certainty-a risk to which Almota had always
been subject.'8 5
80
In the second "just compensation" case, United States v. Fuller,'
condemnees operated a large scale cow-calf ranch in Arizona on 1,280
acres owned in fee, 12,027 acres leased from the state, and 31,461
acres held under federal grazing permits revocable at will by the government. When the United States condemned 920 acres of the fee lands,
the issue arose whether, for the purpose of fixing just compensation,
the jury could consider the value accruing to the fee lands as a result
of their actual or potential use in conjunction with the "permit" lands.
The condemnee's argument was very similar to that which had prevailed in Almota-a willing buyer would pay a premium due to the adjacent location of the permit lands even though there was the possibility
that the government would revoke the permit. But this time the result
183. 409 U.S. 470 (1973).
184. Id. at 481-82.
185. Id. at 486.
186. Id. at 488.
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was different: Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that "the Government as condemnor may not be required to compensate a comdemnee for elements of value that the Government has created, or that it
might have destroyed under the exercise of governmental authority
other than the power of eminent domain."' 87
Thus in two successive cases, Rehnquist voted against broader
constitutional definitions of property. While the entire just compensation area is rife with historical contradictions between fairness and utility, it is clear that Rehnquist shows greater concern for the legitimate
demands of the government than for the equities of property owners.
One could argue that the Salyer case 88 demonstrates a more searching
concern for property rights than Rehnquist exhibits in Nelms, Almota,
and Fuller. Certainly, in Salyer, -theinterests of large landowners were
given great protection. Yet it must be remembered that interests of
the small property owners with respect to flood control were left to the
mercy of four large corporations. However, any argument that Rehnquist sees his constitutional mission as the defense of large scale property interests is refuted by Almota and Fuller in which he rejected the
claims of two substantial property owners. It is more likely that the
key to Rehnquist's decisions lies not in the size of the property interest
but in the conflicting nature of the governmental interest. All four of
these decisions can be explained as "pro-government." In Salyer,
Rehnquist accepted California's conclusion that preferential voting was
necessary to encourage participation in water storage districts, and in
Nelms, Almota and Fuller, he refused to adopt more liberal notions of
compensation which could well 'have had an adverse impact on the public fisc.
Solicitude for the governmental interest reappeared as -the dominant concern in Rehnquist's recent plurality opinion in Arnett v.
Kennedy, 8 9 which turned on the definition of "property" within the
meaning of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The
plaintiff in Arnett alleged that his discharge from federal employment
without a prior evidentiary hearing was a denial of due process. Rehnquist reasoned that since the statute that created -theright to continuing
employment, subject only to removal for cause, also qualified that right
by limiting the procedural safeguards to a post-termination 'hearing, the
plaintiff's substantive property interest extended only so far as the statu187. Id. at 492.
188. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
panying notes 95-106 supra.
189. 416U.S. 134 (1974).

See text accom-
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tory procedure provided for its protection. 190 In effect, the plurality
viewed -the statute as determining not only the nature of the employee's
property right, but also the necessary extent of procedural
protection,
19
process.
due
of
standards
constitutional
to
regard
without
Arnett is difficult to justify in light of such procedural due process
landmarks as Goldberg v. Kelly,' 92 and six justices expressly repudiated
the plurality's limitation on the concept of property. 9 3 Rehnquist's approach reflects a willingness to subordinate property interests to the
principle of judicial self-restraint. Arnett further demonstrates that
Rehnquist's overriding commitment to judicial deference to legislative
determinations is not shared by a majority of ,the Court; thus, it appears
that the rationale of the plurality opinion will have little impact on future decisions affecting property rights.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist and Judicial Conservatism
The wide-ranging activism of the Warren Court provoked volumes
of commentary regarding the appropriate role of the Court in our society. Many who agreed with the economic, social, and political views
of the justices were nevertheless profoundly disturbed that the Court
had become such a frank, policymaking institution. 194 Rather than
nudging the country along slowly, the Court boldly seized the leadership initiative. President Nixon made it clear that he would seek to
reverse this trend by appointing strict constructionists.' 95 While the
president himself appeared to confuse judicial conservatism with political conservatism, 19 6 the same cannot necessarily be said of his appointees.
190. Id. at 152.
191. Under the doctrine set forth in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972), the "property" which must constitutionally be protected by due process was defined to include government benefits to which an individual has a "legitimate claim of
entitlement" under either statutory or common law. Id. at 577. Rehnquist's opinion
in Arnett follows logically from the "entitlement" doctrine of Roth, since it could not
be said that Arnett had a reasonable expectancy of government employment without the
procedural limitations which Congress attached to it.
192. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg, the Court held that welfare benefits constituted a statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them but that statutory
termination procedures were nevertheless subject to independent constitutional standards
of procedural due process.
193. 416 U.S. 134, 164 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the result in part), id. at 171 (White, J., concurring in part); id. at 203
(Douglas, J., dissenting), id. at 206 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
194. For a classic summary of this view, see A. BicxEL, Trm Sul'REME COURT AND
THE IDEA OF PROGnESS (1970).
195. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1971, at 24, col. 3.
196. On October 21, 1971, President Nixon began his announcement of the ap-
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The classic judicial conservative, like Brandeis, Frankftrter, or
Harlan, seeks to limit the judicial function in three ways: he defers
judgment altogether or, in rendering judgment, he defers to political
institutions or to prior judicial opinions. Whether Justice Rehnquist fits
this distinctive mold is a fascinating question.
Deference to Political Institutions
Any investigation of Rehnquist's overall judicial philosophy must
begin with his powerful dissent in Furman v. Georgia,1 97 the case in
which the Court overturned the death penalty. This dissent is worth
analyzing in some detail, because it is so obviously a deeply felt expression of his personal views.
Rehnquist rightly perceived the case as posing the fundamental
dilemma of judicial review in a democratic society:
How can government by the elected representatives of the people
co-exist with the power of the federal judiciary, whose members
are constitutionally insulated from responsiveness to the popular
laws duly enacted by the popular branches
will, to declare invalid
98
of government?
Citing Alexander Hamilton's FederalistPaper No. 78 and Marshall's
opinion in Marbury v. Madison,'9 9 Rehnquist reasoned that since the
people have spoken in the Constitution, its commands are superior to
those of the legislature, which is only an agent of the people. 200 Thus,
the Supreme Court is performing the function assigned to it by article
pointments of Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist with the following remarks: "As
far as judicial philosophy is concerned, it is my belief that it is the duty of a judge to
interpret the Constitution, and not to place himself above the Constitution or outside
the Constitution.
"He should not twist or bend the Constitution in order to perpetuate his personal,
political and social views.
"As a judicial conservative, I believe some Court decisions have gone too far in the
past in weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in our society.
"In maintaining-as it must be maintained-the delicate balance between the rights
of society and defendants accused of crime, I believe the peace forces must not be denied
the legal tools they need to protect the innocent from criminal elements.
"And I believe we can strengthen the hand of the peace forces without compromising our precious principle that the rights of individuals accused of crimes must always
be protected.
"It is with these criteria in mind that I have selected the two men whose names
I will send to the Senate tomorrow." N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1971, at 24, col. 3. See
also Dershowitz, Of Tustice and 'Philosophies,' N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1971, § 4, at 1,
col. 5.
197. 409 U.S. 238, 465 (1972).
198. Id. at 466.
199. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
200. 408 U.S. at 466.
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Itof the Constitution when it strikes down a law which violates that
document. However, because the power of the Court is both great and
final, Rehnquist cautioned that the Court must adjudicate constitutional
questions "with the deepest humility and genuine deference to legislative judgment." 0 1 Humility is needed because of "the natural desire
that beguiles judges along with other human beings into imposing their
own views of goodness, truth, and justice upon others. 20 2 Deference
to legislative judgment is essential not only to guide the Court but also
to avoid the serious error of imposing upon the people "the judicial fiat
of a majority of a court of judges whose connection with the popular
will is remote at best."2
For Rehnquist, to sustain a particular enactment at the expense of wrongfully depriving an individual of his constitutional rights constitutes a far less serious danger than to strike down
a duly enacted law in a misguided effort to protect an individual. Thus,
if constitutional errors are to be made, it is better to make them on
the side of upholding legislative action.
In summary, Rehnquist characterized the majority opinion in Furman as an egregious violation of the notion of checks and balances:
While overreaching by the Legislative and Executive Branches may
result in the sacrifice of individual protections that the Constitution
was designed to secure against action of the State, judicial overreaching may result in sacrifice of the equally important right of
the people to goven -themselves...
The very nature of judicial review . . . makes the courts the
least subject to Madisonian check in the event that they shall, for
the best of motives, expand judicial authority beyond the limits
contemplated by the Framers. It is for this reason that judicial selfrestraint is surely an implied, if not an expressed, condition of the
grant of authority of judicial review. The Court's holding in these
cases has been reached,
I believe, in complete disregard of that im20 4
plied condition.
The common thread running through virtually all of Rehnquist's
opinions is deference -to governmental judgment, whether legislative or
executive. 20 5 In his civil liberties 'and property rights decisions, Rehnquist has demonstrated that he is more prepared than any other member of the Court to uphold governmental action. In cases involving the
First Amendment, voting rights, equal protection, and due process, he
invariably asks only whether there is some rational nexus between the
201. Id. at 468.
202. Id. at 467.
203. Id. at 468.
204. Id. at 470.
205. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 338 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (legislative branch); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972) (executive branch).
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challenged statute or action and a legitimate end. Similarly, in criminal
procedure cases, he considers only the reasonableness of -the conduct
of public officials. Under these permissive standards of review, he
rarely finds governmental action unconstitutional.
Rehnquist's deference to other governmental bodies is not limited
to the national legislative and executive branches. In his view, state
institutions equally represent the expressed will of the people. This
is not to say that Rehnquist necessarily places a high value on federalism per se,20 as Justice Harlan did,207 for it is clear that his paramount
belief is that the judicial role should be limited vis-6-vis popularly
elected political entities. Thus, he is as prepared to uphold a state
anti-abortion statute or the search -and seizure policies of local police 20 8
as he is to sustain either eligibility requirements for food stamps or the
condemnation policies of the federal executive.
Avoidance Techniques
In addition to deferring to other political institutions, a judicial
conservative also avoids judgment entirely whenever possible. By narrowing the concept of justiciability, the Court can avoid passing on209a
large number of the constitutional questions which come before it.
Judicial restraint in this sense not only ensures against premature judicial
action but also, as a practical matter, diminishes the role of the Court.
Once denied judicial relief, parties must then take their complaints to
the political branches of government.
In several instances, Rehnquist has used the techniques of restraint to avoid constitutional issues. In a dissenting opinion in Roe
v. Wade,2 10 he indicated -thathe would have dismissed the suit for lack
of standing. He alleged that the majority was deciding a hypothetical
lawsuit because the record did not indicate that the plaintiff was in her
first trimester of pregnancy at some time during the pendency of her
lawsuit. Thus, he found the Court's announcement that a state could
impose virtually no restrictions on abortions performed during the first
trimester completely unwarranted.
Another example is Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Socialist
206. But see City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 640,
643 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
207. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
208. Although the local police generally are .not popularly elected, they are a part
of, and directly responsible to, the local government.
209. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919).
210. 410 U.S. 113, 171 (1973).
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Labor Party v. Gilligan.2 1 ' There he dismissed the Party's challenge
to an Ohio election code requirement that a political party execute a
loyalty oath in order to obtain a ballot position. Rehnquist looked beyond the jurisdictional prerequisites of standing and genuine case or
controversy 212 and focused instead on the necessity for Supreme Court
intervention in the immediate case. The seldom used Rescue Army
doctrine 21 3 provided authority for the principle ithat the Court should
withhold exercise of its jurisdiction when constitutional issues are
presented prematurely or in abstract form. Since the Socialist Labor
Party had appeared on the state ballot many times subsequent to the
institution of the oath requirement, Rehnquist concluded that adjudication of the merits should await such time as the plaintiff could clearly
demonstrate injury resulting from application of the challenged pro2 4
vision. 1
The best demonstration of Rehnquist's adherence to principles of
judicial restraint is found in Moose Lodge v. Irvis.21 5 Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the Court, dismissed the complaint of a black guest
who was refused service in the dining room of a private club. At a
technical level, the Court held that the plaintiff had no standing to contest the membership policies of the Lodge because he had neither applied for, nor been denied, membership. On a broader plane, Rehnquist ruled that the policies of the Lodge with respect to serving guests
were not subject to constitutional scrutiny, because no state action was
involved. Seeking to preserve a distinction between the public and
private domains, he carved out an area over which the Supreme Court
would have no authority. This could be justified as protecting private
freedom of association from governmental intrusion, yet there is
nothing in Rehnquist's opinion to indicate that he was acting on the
basis of the First Amendment. It is much more likely that he was engaged in an ordered judicial retreat, leaving the field to be occupied
by the legislature. In light of Rehnquist's broad construction of the
Twenty-first Amendment in California v. LaRue,21 6 it is inconceivable
that he would overturn a state requirement that liquor licensees (such
as the Lodge) not discriminate on the basis of race. Thus, consistent
with classic judicial conservatism, Rehnquist avoided one important issue on the technical ground of standing and announced an even broader
211. 406 U.S. 583 (1972).
212. Id. at 588.
213. Rescue Army v. Municipal Ct., 331 U.S. 549, 584 (1947).
214. 406 U.S. at 588.
215. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
216. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
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area over which the Court would not assert authority in the future. 21 7
Stare Decisis
Normally one thinks of -ajudicially conservative judge as one who
religiously follows precedent. Not only does this practice result in continuity in the law, but it also leaves less to the discretion of the
individual judge. He need only find the controlling precedent, and he
can then mechanically announce the preordained result. Merely to
state such an hypothesis is to demonstrate how far it is from the realities
of constitutional adjudication. Even during his confirmation hearings,
Rehnquist acknowledged the more limited role that stare decisis plays
in constitutional as compared to statutory interpretation.2 18 The theory
is that legislatures can correct mistaken interpretations of statutes, but
only the Supreme Court can revise erroneous interpretations of the
Constitution. -19
At some point constant change will erode the authority of 'both the
Constitution and the Court, yet determining precisely where this point
lies poses a serious dilemma for a judicial conservative. He is primarily
motivated to limit the role of the Court through deference to other political institutions and through judicial restraint. On the other hand,
prior judicial pronouncements may dictate intervention. This problem
is particularly acute for the conservative members of the Burger Court
faced with the activist legacy of the Warren era. For the most part
Rehnquist has "solved" this dilemma by simply refusing to be bound
by precedent. His equal protection ,and voting rights decisions provide
numerous examples of his disregard for stare decisis. He is obviously
prepared to sacrifice continuity for the high cause of reducing the
Court's role in society.
Given the nature of his dilemma, it is incorrect to label Rehnquist
a judicial aotivist merely because he feels relatively free to ignore
prior decisions. At least to this point in his career as a justice, he has
consistently sought to cut back the extent of judicial review. This can
be termed activism only in a very specialized sense of the word. However, Rehnquist can be criticized for not always adequately explaining
217. See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 43 U.S.L.W. 4110 (Dec. 24,
1974). Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, upheld termination of electrical service, without prior notice or opportunity for a hearing, by a privately owned, state regulated utility corporation. The basis of the decision was that the state was not sufficiently connected with the termination to support a finding of state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
218. ConfirmationHearings, supranote 20, at 138.
219. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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why prior decisions ought not to control in a particular case. Although
it is legitimate to use the power to overrule when logic demands, that
logic ought to be clearly expressed. For example, Rehnquist has explained at length his unique approach to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although he has convinced few people that the equal protection clock
ought to be set back one hundred years, at least his reasoning is explicit and not without some basis in history. On the other hand, his
2 20 is less defensible. In deciding
recent opinion in Edelman v. Jordan
that federal court actions seeking retroactive welfare payments were
21
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, he argued that Ex parte Young '
permits only prospective relief in such actions which are in effect
brought against the state. In so doing, he overruled several recent
cases which had upheld retroactive relief without analyzing the issue
in Eleventh Amendment terms. Yet nowhere in his opinion did Rehnquist indicate why there was a constitutional line between prospective
and retroactive relief. Although the latter may be more burdensome
on the state, the Eleventh Amendment is couched in absolute terms
which do not support the distinction Rehnquist has drawn. Such gaps
in analysis cannot be justified under -the banner of judicial restraint.
Conclusion
The political liberals who feared that Justice Rehnquist would be
unwilling to play an active role in defense of civil liberties have been
as disappointed as they expected to be. On the other hand, the political conservatives who hoped that he would elevate property rights to
a higher constitutional level have been equally disappointed. 22 The
overriding theme of Rehnquist's opinions to date has been deference
to the judgment of society's political institutions. He is almost always
prepared to allow the elected officials of the people to 'adjust conflicting
social interests, subject only to minimal judicial scrutiny. In this sense,
Justice Rehnquist's beliefs about the limited role of the Court as the
guarantor of liberty are summarized well by Justice Frankfurter's
famous concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States:
Civil liberties draw at best only limited strength from legal
guaranties. Preoccupation by our people with the constitutionality,
instead of with the wisdom, of legislation or of executive action is
220.

415 U.S. 651 (1974).

221. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). This was a watershed case holding that the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar a federal court action to enjoin enforcement by a state official
of a statute claimed to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
222. This disappointment has been assuaged, however, by Rehnquist's criminal procedure opinions.
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preoccupation with a false value. . .. Focusing attention on constitutionality tends to make constitutionality synonymous with wisdom. When legislation touches freedom of thought and freedom
of speech, such a tendency is a formidable enemy of the free spirit.
Much that should be rejected as illiberal, because repressive and envenoming, may well be not unconstitutional. The ultimate reliance
for ,the deepest needs of civilization must be found outside their vin-

dication in courts of law.

....

223

Ultimately two major questions are left unanswered by this approach. Can the American people, so long accustomed to relying on
an active, policymaking Court, adequately protect precious liberties
solely by resort to political institutions? And given that judicial review
is inherent in our constitutional system, what is the proper way for -the
Court to fulfill its obligation? Justice Rehnquist is now squarely faced
with these questions. How he works out his answers over the coming
years may have great impact on both the Court and -the country.

223.

341 U.S. 494, 555-56 (1951).

